Abstract. This paper proposes an access control mechanism of verifiable cloud computing services using chameleon hashing and Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. By this mechanism, an entity can apply for cloud computing services and he can authorize other users to access granted data or services. When an authorized user or entity wants to access cloud computing services, he can authenticate the cloud computing service provider. Moreover, no entity secret will be revealed by data kept by cloud servers such that security and cost saving can be both ensured. Security proof under the simulation paradigm is also given.
Introduction
Before the concept of cloud computing is introduced, similar concepts or computing models have been proposed such as distributed computing, grid computing, and utility computing. No matter which kind of computing model it is, the main concept is utilizing resources centrally. Cloud computing is composed of a front end, cloud computing services, and a back end, cloud computing technologies. Several institutes and companies, such as NIST, Gartner, Forrester, Google, Microsoft, IBM, and Wikipedia, define cloud computing with different definitions. But, could computing must provide the following four properties: (1) Services are provided via the Internet. (2) Resources can be managed and arranged dynamically. (3) A distributed virtual architecture exists. (4) Possible fees may be charged according to services requested or demands.
Cloud computing services can be divided into three categories: (1) Software as a Service (SaaS), (2) Plateform as a Service (PaaS), and (3) Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). Via SaaS, software is kept and maintained by SaaS providers, and users directly use it via the Internet. Via PaaS, customers can release their designed applications on the platform, such as Google and AppEngine. Via IaaS, customers can control operation systems, storages, networks, and applications without managing the infrastructure. According to deployment mechanisms, cloud computing services can be divided into three categories: (1) public cloud, (2) private cloud, and (3) hybrid cloud. With public cloud, services, which users apply for, are provided by independent cloud computing service providers. Meanwhile, cloud computing service providers also provide services for other users. That is, resources of these cloud computing service providers are shared by users. With private cloud, the cloud computing infrastructure and environment are built and used by one specific company or institute. Users of private cloud must be internal ones such that external users cannot use cloud computing services of private cloud. With hybrid cloud, a company or institute has possessed a well-constructed system. The company only needs to classify data by security requirements and spends a little money to upgrade the existing system to utilize cloud computing services of flexibility, scalability, and high efficiency. No matter which kind of cloud computing service model is applied, it always can be built by the above three deployment mechanisms. Moreover, a user can freely choose a cloud computing service model with one specific deployment mechanism according to his security requirements.
Wireless technologies and systems, such as WLAN, WMAN, GPRS, and 3.5 G, provide ubiquitous network services. Users can use various kinds of devices to access cloud computing services via the Internet. Meanwhile, enterprises can save lots of costs to construct or maintain information infrastructure while utilizing cloud computing services provided by the cloud computing service provider. General users, small and medium-sized enterprises and venture companies tend to choose cloud computing services of public cloud such as Gmail and Google docs. On the other hand, financial institutions, government institutions and large-sized enterprises tend to choose cloud computing services of private cloud or hybrid cloud. However, whether the provided cloud computing services are under proper protection is still doubted. Thus, no matter which kind of deployment models the chosen cloud computing services belong to, it is always a tradeoff between security and cost saving.
In general, resources such as data and programs are kept by distributed systems to make them accessed easily. There usually exist many entities in distributed systems, where an entity may be a user or a group. Entities possess different rights on resources, and one entity only can access authorized resources according to the corresponding access right via access control (Denning et al., 1986; Denning, 1984; Davida et al., 1981) . According to relationships between different entities, access control can be divided into two categories: (1) hierarchical access control and (2) arbitrary complicated access control. Because many organizations or companies are organized hierarchically, hierarchical access control is the most common (Chien and Jan, 2003; Chang et al., 1992; Hwang, 2000; Chung et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2003; Yeh et al., 1998; Chang and Chang, 2007) . Arbitrary complicated access control provides flexible organization, but it is hard to be designed and managed. Thus arbitrary complicated access control is not common. Hierarchical access control can be further divided into two types: (1) conventional tree hierarchy access control (Chien and Jan, 2003; Chang et al., 1992; Hwang, 2000; Chung et al., 2008) and (2) complicated access control in a hierarchy (Lin et al., 2003; Yeh et al., 1998; Chang and Chang, 2007) .
In general, access control on cloud computing services uses password and identity to authenticate users -Dropbox, Gmail, Amazon EC2, Apple iCould, and Amazon Cloud Storage for example. However, this approach makes cloud servers need to store a user's identity, password, and the corresponding encryption/decryption related information. If a customer wants to apply specific security services such as hierarchical access control to cloud computing services, common access control mechanisms cannot comply with this special requirement. The only way to solve this problem is customization or mechanism integration. Nevertheless, this approach tends to be time-consuming and expensive.
In this paper, the concepts of chameleon hashing (Krawczyk and Rabin, 2000) and Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol are employed to propose an access control mechanism for verifiable cloud computing services. In the proposed access control mechanism, an entity can apply for cloud computing services via the trustworthy registration center's help. The trustworthy registration center acts as a cloud computing service broker, and all users and could computing service providers trust the registration center (Chonka et al., 2011) . The entity can authorize other users to access granted data or services by issuing them corresponding authorization items. Thereupon, a user can use the issued authorization items to access cloud computing services. Meanwhile, cloud computing service providers can be authenticated, and cloud computing service providers cannot obtain any secret information of entities or users. Moreover, the security is proved under the simulation paradigm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces chameleon hashing. The proposed access control mechanism for verifiable cloud computing services is shown in Section 3 followed by analyses in Section 4. At last, some conclusions are made in Section 5.
Chameleon Hashing
In this section, the concept of chameleon hashing is introduced. Krawczyk and Rabin first proposed the concept of chameleon hashing (2000) and proposed chameleon signature by chameleon hashing. Chameleon hashing is different from other collision-resistant hashing such as SHA-1. Chameleon hashing possesses four properties. Before demonstrating these four properties, suppose there exist a key pair (pk hash , sk FindingCollisionTrapdoor ) and a chameleon hash function H (.), where pk hash is public and sk FindingCollisionTrapdoor is private. Computation efficiency: If pk hash is known, it is efficient to compute H pk hash (m, r) with given m and r. Collision resistance: When sk FindingCollisionTrapdoor is unknown, it is hard to find (m1, r1) and (m2, r2) such that m1 = m2 and H pk hash (m1, r1) = H pk hash (m2, r2). Trapdoor collision: When sk FindingCollisionTrapdoor is known, there exists an efficient algorithm to get (m2, r2) with given (m1, r1) and pk hash such that H pk hash (m1, r1) = H pk hash (m2, r2). Uniformity: With arbitrary m, H pk hash (m, r) reveals no information related to it because r is chosen uniformly. Krawczyk and Rabin (2000) proposed chameleon hashing based on the difficulty of solving discrete logarithm problems. The proposed chameleon hash is H (m, r) = g m y r mod p, where p is a large prime, g is a generator in GF(p), x is the private key, and y = g x mod p is the public key. 
The Proposed Access Control Mechanism for Verifiable Cloud Computing Services
In this section, the proposed access control mechanism for verifiable cloud computing services is demonstrated. There exists one trustworthy registration center R in the access control mechanism. The trustworthy registration center R is responsible for transmitting essential data to a cloud computing service provider S j when an entity G i applies for S j 's service for the first time. Both S j and G i trust R, and an entity G i can be a group, a company, an institution, or a user. The proposed access control mechanism is composed of four phases: cloud computing service applying phase, authorization verification item adding and updating phase, authorization item obtaining phase, and cloud computing service accessing phase. The details are as follows.
Cloud Computing Service Applying Phase
In this phase, an entity G i , who wants to apply for a cloud computing service provider S j 's could computing service, needs to register at S j with the trustworthy registration center R's assistance. In this phase, data must be delivered via secure channels. This phase is depicted in Fig. 1 , and the details are as follows.
Step 1: G i chooses his identity GID i and sends a registration request including GID i to R.
Step 2: After getting G i 's registration request, R checks if the received GID i is duplicated. If it is fresh, R chooses a large prime p, a primitive element g in GF(p) and a collision-resistant hash function h(.) and sends {g, p, h(.)} to G i , where p = 2q + 1 and q is a large prime.
Step 3: After receiving {g, p, h(.)}, G i randomly chooses x i ∈ Z p−1 and β i ∈ Z p−1 and computes y i = g x i mod p, A i = g β i mod p, and s i = h(x i ||A i ||β i ), where || denotes a concatenation operator. At last, G i stores {GID i , x i , A i , β i , g, p, h(.)} and sends {GID i , A i , y i , s i } to R. Step 4: When receiving {GID i , A i , y i , s i }, R sends {GID i , A i , y i , s i , g, p, h(.)} to S j . At last, S j stores an authentication entry {GID i , A i , y i , s i , g, p, h(.)} to authenticate G i .
Authorization Verification Item Adding and Updating Phase
After applying for S j 's service, G i can add or update authorization verification items such that only users authorized by G i can access the cloud computing service which S j provides to G i . When G i only wants to update authorization verification items, all G i needs to do is explicitly indicating them. In the following, how G i adds a new authorization verification item is shown, which is depicted in Fig. 2 .
Step 1: When G i wants to add a new authorization verification item, G i sends an authorization verification item adding request with GID i and A i to S j .
Step 2: After getting the authorization verification item adding request, S j checks if there exists a record with respect to GID i and A i . If such an item exists, S j chooses three random numbers α ∈ Z * p−1 , ω ∈ Z p−1 , and x ik ∈ Z p−1 and computes m 1 = g α mod p, y ik = g x ik mod p, m 2 = A x ik i mod p, and m 3 = h(m 1 ||ω||s i ||y i ||m 2 ). Then, S j sends {m 1 , m 3 , y ik , ω} to G i . Step 3: After getting S j 's response {m 1 , m 3 , y ik , ω}, G i computes m 4 = h(x i ||A i ||β i ) and m 5 = y β i ik mod p and checks if m 3 = h(m 1 ||ω||m 4 ||g x i mod p||m 5 ) holds or not. If it does not hold, G i regards S j as an illegal cloud computing service provider and terminates the phase immediately. Otherwise, G i computes r = β i − x i ω mod (p − 1), m 6 = m r 1 mod p, and m 7 = g r×m 4 mod p. G i randomly chooses β ik ∈ Z p−1 and computes
, and m 10 = h(A ik ||s ik ||m 4 ). At last, G i stores {A ik , β ik , y ik } and sends {GID i , A i , m 6 , m 8 , m 9 , m 10 } to S j .
Step 4 . It they are not equal, S j regards G i 's authentication data is incorrect and denies G i 's authorization verification item adding request; otherwise, S j stores the new-added authorization verification item {A ′ ik , s ′ ik , x ik }. Note that S j may store multiple authorization verification items for one entity G i .
Authorization Item Obtaining Phase
In this phase, a user U can send a request to G i to get authorization items when U wants to get G i 's data or share G i 's resource. G i can determine which data or resource can be accessed by U . In this phase, data must be delivered via secure channels. This phase is depicted in Fig. 3 , and the details are as follows.
Step 1: U sends an authorization item obtaining request to G i .
Step 2: G i determines which data or resource can be accessed by U and gets appropriate
Cloud Computing Service Accessing Phase
After getting G i 's authorization items, U can directly access G i 's corresponding data or service provided by S j . When U wants to access S j 's service, this phase is depicted in Step 1: U chooses a random number σ ∈ Z p−1 , computes m 1 = g σ mod p, and sends GID i , A ik and m 1 to S j as a cloud computing service access request.
Step 2: After getting the request, S j first checks if there exists an entry with respect to GID i and A ik . If no such entry exists, S j terminates this phase directly. Otherwise, S j chooses two random numbers α ∈ Z * p−1 and ω ∈ Z p−1 , computes m 2 = g α mod p, m 3 = m x ik 1 mod p, and m 4 = h(m 2 ||ω||s ik ||y i ||m 3 ), and sends {m 2 , m 4 , ω} to U .
Step 3: After receiving {m 2 , m 4 , ω}, U computes m 5 = h(x i ||A ik ||β ik ) and m 6 = y σ ik mod p and checks if m 4 = h(m 2 ||ω||m 5 ||g x i mod p||m 6 ). If it does not hold, U regards S j as an illegal cloud computing service provider and terminates this phase immediately; otherwise,
Step 4: After getting the reply {GID i , A ik , m 7 }, S j computes m 9 = m α −1 7 mod p and checks if A ik = m 9 × y ω i mod p. If it does not hold, S j regards U as an illegal user and terminates this phase immediately; otherwise, S j computes m 10 = m α×s ik 1 mod p.
After the above steps, S j and U authenticate each other and m 8 = m 10 = g σ ×α×s ik mod p. The session key, m 8 /m 10 , can be used to protect the following communication content.
Analyses on the Proposed Access Control Mechanism for Verifiable Cloud Computing Services
In this section, security analyses are first given to show that no one can retrieve unauthorized secret and impersonate one party to cheat another legality party. Then further discussions are made to show properties of the proposed mechanism.
Security Analyses
The security bases of the proposed mechanism are secure one-way hash function and discrete logarithm problem. The corresponding definitions are given as follows.
A one-way hash function, h(.) : x → y, is secure if it is easy to compute h(x) = y of fixed length for any given variable x while it is computationally infeasible to derive x from any given y.
D
2. Discrete logarithm problem (DLP): Let G be an abelian group, g ∈ G of order n. Given y ∈ G, find x such that y = g x . For a variable x and given y, the probability of h(x) = y is Proof. Because p is a prime, p and g are coprime. According to Theorem 1, g φ(p) ≡ g (p−1) ≡ 1 (mod p). Since g is a primitive element in GF(p), the order for g is (p − 1) such that x is in [1, p − 1]. Given p, g, and y, the probability of y = g x mod p is 1 p−1 . If DLP is hard, it is intractable to find x such that y = g x mod p such that 1 p−1 is negligible.
Theorem 1 (Euler's Theorem
In order to prove the security of the proposed mechanism, the concept from the simulation paradigm is taken. For any adversary A, given g, p, and h(.), A is capable of intercepting transmitted data, randomly choosing δ, and computing g δ mod p and hash function operations. Within a time bound t, A can determine whether the retrieved secret is correct by making at most q passive passive checking iterations. Within a time bound t, A can impersonate G i /S j to cheat S j /G i or U by making at most q active active authentication sessions. The following derivation is under a strong assumption that g, p and h(.) for all entities and cloud computing service providers are the same though they may differ. Because messages are transmitted via secure channels in cloud computing service applying phase and authorization item obtaining phase, no one except the involved parties can get the transmitted messages in these two phases.
Lemma 3. Let A be neither a user of G i nor S j . Given g, p, h(.) and the intercepted messages in authorization verification item adding and updating phase and cloud computing service accessing phase, A can retrieve G i 's secret β i , G i 's authorization item secret β ik , or S j 's secret x ik within a time bound t by making at most q passive passive checking iterations of probability at most
Proof. Let S1 denote the event that A can retrieve G i 's secret β i , G i 's authorization item secret β ik , or S j 's secret x ik within a time bound t by making at most q passive passive checking iterations. Pr[S1] denotes the successful probability of event S1. A has g, p, h(.) and the intercepted messages transmitted via insecure channels. A is capable of randomly choosing δ ∈ Z p−1 and computing R = g δ mod p. For each checking iteration, A randomly chooses δ ∈ Z p−1 and computes
We can get the lower and upper bounds of Pr[S1] as follows:
Because p is a large prime, Eqs. (1) and (2) are rewritten as follows. 
Proof. Let S2 denote the event that A can retrieve G i 's secret β i or S j 's secret x ik within a time bound t by making at most q passive passive checking iterations. Pr[S2] denotes the successful probability of event S2. A has an theorization item {A ik , β ik , y ik }, GID i , x i , g, p, h(.) and the intercepted messages transmitted via insecure channels.
A is capable of randomly choosing δ ∈ Z p−1 and computing R = m δ 1 mod p, where m 1 = g α mod p intercepted in authorization verification item adding and updating phase. If R and m 6 are equal, r = δ and β i = δ + x i ω mod (p − 1). From above, the probability to retrieve G i 's secret β i by making at most q passive passive checking iterations is
. When A randomly chooses δ ∈ Z p−1 and computes R = g δ mod p, A checks if R equals y ik . If it holds, x ik = δ. Thus, the probability to retrieve S j 's secret x ik by making at most q passive passive checking iterations is p, h(.) , and intercepted messages in authorization verification item adding and updating phase and cloud computing service accessing phase, A can retrieve another authorization item {A ik , β ik , y ik } of G i by making at most q passive passive checking iterations of probability at most
The lower and upper bounds of Pr[S2] are as follows:
Proof. Let S3 denote the event that A can retrieve another authorization item {A ik , β ik , y ik } of G i within a time bound t by making at most q passive passive checking iterations. Pr [S3] denotes the successful probability of event S3. A has an theorization item {A ′ ik , β ′ ik , y ′ ik }, GID i , x i , g, p, h(.) and the intercepted messages transmitted via insecure channels. A is capable of randomly choosing δ ∈ Z p−1 and computing R = m δ 2 mod p, where m 2 = g α mod p intercepted in cloud computing service accessing phase. If R and m 7 are equal, r = δ and β ik = δ + x i ω mod (p − 1). From above, the probability to retrieve another authorization item {A ik , β ik , y ik } by making at most q passive passive checking iterations is
The lower and upper bounds of Pr[S3] are as follows: 
Proof. Let S4 denote the event that A can retrieve G i 's secret β i or G i 's authorization item secret β ik within a time bound t by making at most q passive passive checking iterations. Pr[S4] denotes the successful probability of event S4. A has GID i , A i , y i , s i , g, p, h(.), {A ik , s ik , x ik } and the intercepted messages transmitted via insecure channels. A is capable of randomly choosing δ ∈ Z p−1 and computing R = g δ mod p. For each checking iteration, A randomly chooses δ ∈ Z p−1 and computes R = g δ mod p. If R equals A i , β i = δ. If R equals A ik , β ik = δ. From above, we have
Because p is a large prime, the lower and upper bounds of Pr[S4] are as follows: 
Proof. Let S5 denote the event that A can retrieve S j 's secret x ik within a time bound t by making at most q passive passive checking iterations. Pr[S5] denotes the successful probability of event S5. A has GID i , x i , A i , β i , g, p, h(.), {A ik , β ik , y ik }, and the intercepted messages transmitted via insecure channels. A is capable of randomly choosing δ ∈ Z p−1 and computing R = g δ mod p, A checks if R equals y ik . If it holds, x ik = δ. Thus, the probability to retrieve S j 's secret x ik by making at most q passive passive checking iterations is
The lower and upper bounds of Pr[S5] are as follows:
Theorem 2. Suppose solving DLP is hard, no adversary A can retrieve any unauthorized secret with a non-negligible probability.
Proof. By Lemmas 3-7, upper bounds for probabilities of retrieving unauthorized secret are given. If DLP is hard, the probability 1 p−1 is negligible such that probabilities of retrieving any secret approximate 0. For any adversary A, the probability to retrieve unauthorized secret is negligible.
Lemma 8. Let A know none of s i , β i , and y i . In authorization verification item adding and updating phase, A can impersonate S j to cheat G i within a time bound t by making at most q active active authentication sessions of probability at most
Proof. Let S6 denote the event that A impersonates S j to cheat G i within a time bound t by making at most q active active authentication sessions. Pr[S6] denotes the successful probability of event S6. Without knowing s i , β i , and y i , A is capable of randomly choosing δ of length Len h . After getting the authorization verification item adding request, A chooses three random numbers α ∈ Z * p−1 , ω ∈ Z p−1 , and x ik ∈ Z p−1 and computes m 1 = g α mod p, y ik = g x ik mod p, and m 2 = A x ik i mod p. Because A does not know s i , β i , and y i , A sends {m 1 , m 3 , y ik , ω} to G i , where m 3 = δ. After getting {m 1 , m 3 , y ik , ω}, G i authenticates A as mentioned in authorization verification item adding and updating phase. A can be authenticated successfully if and only if δ = h(m 1 ||ω||s i ||y i ||m 2 ). From above, we have
And bounds for Pr[S6] are as follows:
Lemma 9. Let A be unaware of β i . In authorization verification item adding and updating phase, A can impersonate G i to cheat S j within a time bound t by making at most q active active authentication sessions of probability at most
Proof. Let S7 denote the event that A impersonates G i to cheat S j within a time bound t by making at most q active active authentication sessions. Pr[S7] denotes the successful probability of event S7. Without knowing β i , A is capable of randomly choosing δ ∈ Z p−1 and computing R = m δ 1 mod p. A can be authenticated if and only if δ = β i − x i ω mod (p − 1). From above, we have
We can get the lower and upper bounds of Pr[S7] as follows:
Because p is a large prime, the lower and upper bounds of Pr[S7] are as follows:
Lemma 10. Let A be unaware of x ik . In cloud computing service accessing phase, A can impersonate S j to cheat U within a time bound t by making at most q active active authentication sessions of probability at most
Proof. Let S8 denote the event that A impersonates S j to cheat U within a time bound t by making at most q active active authentication sessions. Pr[S8] denotes the successful probability of event S8. Without knowing x ik , A is capable of randomly choosing δ of length Len h . After getting the cloud computing service accessing request, A chooses random numbers α ∈ Z * p−1 and ω ∈ Z p−1 and computes m 2 = g α mod p. Because A does not know x ik , A sends {m 2 , m 4 , ω} to U , where m 4 = δ. After getting {m 2 , m 4 , ω}, U authenticates A as mentioned in cloud computing service accessing phase. A can be authenticated successfully if and only if δ = h(m 2 ||ω||s ik ||y i ||m 3 ). From above, we have
And bounds for Pr[S8] are as follows:
Lemma 11. Let A be unaware of β ik . In cloud computing service accessing phase, A can impersonate U to cheat S j within a time bound t by making at most q active active authentication sessions of probability at most
Proof. Let S9 denote the event that A impersonates U to cheat S j within a time bound t by making at most q active active authentication sessions. Pr[S9] denotes the successful probability of event S9. Without knowing β ik , A is capable of randomly choosing δ ∈ Z p−1 and computing R = m δ 2 mod p. A can be authenticated if and only if δ = β ik − x i ω mod (p − 1). From above, we have
We can get the lower and upper bounds of Pr[S9] as follows:
Because p is a large prime, the lower and upper bounds of Pr[S9] are as follows: p−1 are negligible such that probabilities of successful impersonation attacks approximate 0. For any adversary A, the probability to impersonate one party to cheat another legitimate party in authorization verification item adding and updating phase and cloud computing service accessing phase is negligible.
Further Discussions
In the following, further discussions are made to show properties of the proposed mechanism. Secret retrieval and impersonation attack resistance: By Theorems 2 and 3, no one can retrieve unauthorized secrets used for authentication, and no one can impersonate one party to cheat another. Thus, the proposed mechanism can resist secret retrieval and impersonation attack. Perfect forward secrecy: In cloud computing service accessing phase, only legal U and S j can authenticate each other and negotiate the shared key m 8 = m 10 = g σ ×α×s ik mod p. When other legal user U ′ of G i knows {A ik , β ik , y ik } and tries to get the shared session key g σ ×α×s ik mod p, U ′ can compute s ik = h(x i ||A ik ||β ik ), m s ik 1 mod p = g σ ×s ik mod p, and m s ik 2 mod p = g α×s ik mod p. However, U ′ cannot obtain g σ ×α×s ik mod p successfully. It is because DLP is hard to solve such that U ′ cannot retrieve σ/α from m 1 /m 2 . Even if the secret β ik is known, no one can retrieve previous session keys. Thus, the proposed mechanism provides perfect forward secrecy. Secret protection: By Theorem 2, no one can get unauthorized secrets. Thus, the proposed mechanism ensures secret protection. Flexibility: In the proposed mechanism, a trusted third party R helps G i to register at S j . G i can authorize U to access specific cloud computing services with the given authorization item. S j uses the corresponding authorization verification item to verify whether U is authorized by G i . G i can generate multiple authorization items as needed and issue them to users appropriately. This approach provides high flexibility on authorization. Extensibility: In the proposed mechanism, S j only authenticates the other party with the known secrets without managing authorization issues. G i can apply advanced cryptographic schemes to the proposed mechanism, such as encrypting the essential data with a pre-determined secret key, without G i 's help. This approach makes the essential information concealed even if it is kept by S j . Thus, the proposed mechanism provides extensibility. Audit: When authorized users possess the same rights to modify one specific document, the document owner or the system can trace who modifies it in the designed mechanism with a proper user authentication protocol (Chang et al., 2013; Liao et al., 2010) . For audit, each user first registers at the system and needs to be authenticated to login to the system. After successfully authenticated, the user can perform operations on authorized resources or documents as in the original designed mechanism.
Conclusions
In this paper, an access control mechanism of verifiable cloud computing services is proposed by using chameleon hashing and Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. By the designed mechanism, an entity can apply for cloud computing services and he can authorize other users to access granted data or services. When an authorized user or entity wants to access cloud computing services, he can authenticate the cloud computing service provider. Moreover, no entity secret will be revealed by data kept by cloud servers such that security and cost saving can be both ensured. By the given security analyses, the security of the proposed mechanism is ensured. Moreover, the proposed mechanism provides secret retrieval and impersonation attack resistance, perfect forward secrecy, secret protection, flexibility, and extensibility. The proposed mechanism provides a novel and flexible solution to access control over verifiable cloud computing services.
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Lanksti verifikuojamų debesų kompiuterijos paslaugų prieigos kontrolė su įrodomu saugumu
Ya-Fen CHANG Šiame straipsnyje siūlomas verifikuojamų debesų kompiuterijos paslaugų prieigos kontrolės mechanizmas, kuriam naudojama chameliono maišos funkcija, Difio ir Helmano protokolas. Naudojant šį mechanizmą, subjektas gali teikti paraišką debesų kompiuterijos paslaugoms, suteikti kitiems vartotojams prieigą prie pateiktų duomenų arba paslaugų. Kai registruotas vartotojas arba subjektas nori gauti prieigą prie debesų kompiuterijos paslaugų, jis gali autentifikuoti paslaugų tiekėją. Be to subjekto paslaptys, kurios yra saugojamos serveryje, nebus paviešintos. Taip užtikrinamas saugumas ir mažinamos išlaidos. Pateikiamas saugumo įrodymas, remiantis modeliavimo paradigma.
